The Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States
The Gettysburg Papers
The Strategy of the Gettysburg Campaign.
By Bvt. Lieutenant-Colonel George B. Davis, U.S.A.
It shall be my purpose in this paper to discuss, as briefly as may be, the movements of the Armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia which culminated in the battle of Gettysburg on July 1-3, 1863.
In our endeavor to ascertain the reasons which led General Lee to propose, and the Confederate Government to approve, the movement of invasion in 1863, we shall find but little to assist us in the official correspondence between that officer and the authorities at Richmond. The brief incursion into Maryland in September, 1862, had not been sufficiently fruitful in results to warrant a repetition of the venture on the same or similar lines; and still less was to be hoped for in transferring the theatre of operations to the more thickly settled portions of southern Pennsylvania. Some feeling in behalf of the Confederate cause had been alleged and believed to exist in Maryland so late as the month of September, 1862; but the most ardent sympathizer with the cause of secession had never been able to lay his finger upon any part of Pennsylvania in which a movement of invasion gave promise of anything more than the collection of a moderate amount of subsistence and transportation, and the assurance that the forces engaged would be fed to repletion during the pendency of the operation; and both of these propositions were conditioned upon an amount of inactivity which the Army of the Potomac was not likely to show so soon as it appeared probable that the theatre of military activity was to transferred to the soil of a distinctively Northern State.
That it is generally, if not always, desirable to transfer the theatre of war to the territory of the enemy goes without saying, but usually accompanied by the condition and maintained in the enemy's country; and this, in the case which is under discussion, was plainly impossible. Moreover, there were no large cities or strategic points in that portion of Pennsylvania which was within the reasonable endeavors of the Confederate commander, which could be captured, or held by him, under the most favorable conditions: nor were there any depots or centres of supply which it was either desirable or possible to possess, or which could with any means at his disposal be held for any length of time. A Confederate army invading Pennsylvania was like a stream of water forced into the air by a powerful pump; it encountered constantly increasing resistance, the demands of gravity became steadily more urgent, while its velocity steadily diminished, and it received no increase of force as it ascended.
The moral effect of the invasion was to unite all men in a desire to turn back the tide of invasion at any cost, and, if possible, to inflict such decisive defeat upon the force engaged as would be calculated to prevent its recurrence. Its effect upon the diplomatic fortunes of the Confederacy abroad were too remote, indirect, and uncertain to be worthy of serious consideration. Why, then, was a campaign undertaken from which so little was to be hoped and so much to be feared, in a region filled with an unsympathetic or hostile population; in which hard fighting was inevitable and victory uncertain to an army which was only sure of its board and clothes while it remained north of the Potomac.
The answer to this question must be sought in the situation of the Army of Northern Virginia at the opening of the spring campaign in 1863. It was as certain as anything in war can be that the Army of the Potomac, rapidly recovering from its defeat at Fredericksburg, and still more rapidly, perhaps, regaining under Hooker the spirit and morale which had suffered so severely under the incompetent and inefficient command of General Burnside, would deliver a strong and well directed blow, so soon as the roads became passable in the spring. What the issue of that operation was to be could not, in the nature of things, be foreseen. If it should prove successful, and the preponderance of force was decidedly in favor of the Army of the Potomac, General Lee would find his summer's work already cut out in resisting the further advance of the enemy in the direction of Richmond. If, on the other hand, the advance of the Army of the Potomac should be checked, or, as the event proved, terminate in disaster, then and only then, would it become necessary for the Confederate commander to concert some plan for the resumption of the offensive.
The question has been somewhat incompletely answered by General Lee himself, in a letter addressed to President Davis from Williamsport on July 12th, after his anxiety as to the possibility of effecting a crossing at that point had been somewhat relieved by an opportune fall in the river. In that letter he makes use of the following language: "Had the late unexpected rise not occurred, there would have been no cause of anxiety, as it would have been in my power to recross the Potomac, on my first reaching it, without molestation. Everything would have been accomplished that could have been reasonably expected, - the Army of the Potomac would have been thrown north of that river, the forces invading the coasts of North Carolina and Virginia diminished, their plan of the present campaign broken up, and, before new arrangements could have been made for its resumption, the summer would have been ended."
That a scheme of operations north of the Potomac did engage the attention of General Lee is evidence by the fact that during the preceding winter an experienced topographer had been put at work by General Jackson, with the approval of Lee himself, to compile a map of northeastern Virginia, western Maryland, and southeastern Pennsylvania. The officer selected for this duty - and a better selection could not possibly have been made - was Major Jed Hotchkiss, the engineer officer of Jackson's Corps. Major Hotchkiss is well known, personally and by his works, to the members of this Society, and his assignment to the task was a sufficient guaranty of its successful accomplishment. Such a map must, in the nature of things, have been at best a hasty compilation. The old map of the State of Virginia, prepared early in this century, furnished the data for the territory between the Blue Ridge and the Potomac, and located in outline the rivers and mountain ranges of western Maryland and southern Pennsylvania, leaving only the roads, towns, farms, and other details to be filled in from the county maps, which were procured without difficulty by agents sent into the southern counties of Pennsylvania for this purpose.
The Army of the Potomac during May and early June was engaged in the by no means inconsiderable task of repairing the losses incurred in the disastrous campaign of Chancellorsville. Its severe casualties in battle had not been made good, and were being added to from day to day by the discharge of regiments whose two years' term of service began to expire in May. The idle and useless commands scattered along the Atlantic coast from Pennsylvania to Florida still lacked an intelligent head or a definite purpose, and continued their desultory attempts to injure the enemy in quarters where injury was difficult to inflict and correspondingly easy to repair. To state it in other terms, the returns of June 30th, 1863, showed that there were 125,388 Union troops, in garrison and in the field, serving under other commanders than General Hooker, in the area included between Harrisburg on the north and Newberne on the south, none of whom offered any effective resistance to the advance of the Army of Northern Virginia, or harassed its retreat, or took advantage of its absence from central Virginia to create a diversion by penetrating into territory hitherto unoccupied, and which had been stripped of its garrisons to swell the effective strength of the command operating under the immediate direction of General Lee.
As early as June 5th General Hooker reported that the enemy had broken up and abandoned his camps on the right of his line under circumstances leading to the belief that an operation was contemplated similar to that undertaken in September of the preceding year. With a view to meet this movement General Hooker submitted a proposition in the following terms: "In the event the enemy should move, as I almost anticipate he will, the head of his column will probably be headed toward the Potomac, via Gordonville or Culpeper, while the rear will rest on Fredericksburg. After giving the subject my best reflection, I am of the opinion that it is my duty to pitch into his rear, although in so doing the head of his column may reach Warrenton before my return. Will it be within the spirit of my instructions to do so?" This amounted in substance to a proposition to cross the Rappahannock and attack the enemy wither in the vicinity of Fredericksburg or in the densely-wooded region known as the Wilderness, an area into which the Union army had twice gone to disaster, and in which within a year and under abler direction thousands of its men were still to be lost without decisive advantage. It would not seem to require argument to show that a proposition which involved a possible repetition of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville was hardly likely to meet with the approval of the administration. Indeed, at four o'clock the same afternoon the President replied in the following terms:
"Yours of to-day was received an hour ago. So much of professional skill is requisite to answer it, that I have turned the task over to General Halleck. He promised to perform it with his utmost care. I have but one idea which I think worth suggesting to you, and that is, in case you find Lee coming to the north of the Rappahannock, I should by no means cross to the south of it. If he should leave a force at Fredericksburg, tempting you to fall upon it, it would fight in the in intrenchments and have you at a disadvantage, and so, man for man, worst you at that point, while his main force would in some way be getting an advantage of you northward. In one word, I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river like an ox jumped half over a fence and liable to be torn by dogs front and rear, without a fair chance to gore one way or kick the other. If Lee would come to my side of the river, I would keep on the same side, and fight him or act on the defence, according as might be my estimate of his strength relatively to my own."
On June 10th, the purposes of the enemy having in the meantime been more fully disclosed, General Hooker submitted a second recommendation - this time in the form of a proposition to move on Richmond at once. This suggestion was a meritorious one, and has received the approval of many of those who have made a careful study of the operations which are now under discussion. The chief objection to it - an objection which I believe to have been insurmountable - is that set forth in Mr. Lincoln's reply in the following terms: "If left to me, I would not go south of Rappahannock upon Lee's moving north of it. If you had Richmond invested to-day, you would not be able to take it in twenty days; meanwhile your communications, and with them your army, would be ruined. I think Lee's army, and not Richmond, is your objective point. If he comes toward the Upper Potomac, follow on his flank and on his inside track, shortening your lines while he lengthens his. Fight him, too, when opportunity offers." In this dispatch of the President, so far as its directions were followed, will be found such success as attended the operations of the Army of the Potomac in this eventful campaign.
The area lying in the triangle formed by the Potomac, Rappahannock, and Shenandoah Rivers was to be the immediate theatre of operations of the contending armies. The district thus included was in some respects favorable, and in others decidedly unfavorable, for military operations. Across the western border run two ranges of mountains, the Blue Ridge and the Bull Run or Catoctin range. They lie about fifteen miles apart; their general course is from northeast to southwest, and they are pierced by a number of gaps or passes which were destined to play an important part in the impending campaign. The Shenandoah Valley, lying to the west of the Blue Ridge, contains an excellent turnpike, running its entire length, over which the Army of Northern Virginia passed, without interruption or hindrance, from the Rappahannock to the Potomac; by a system of equally good roads on the north side of that river it made its way into southeastern Pennsylvania. This system of roads General Lee's line of communication during the entire campaign, and was not interrupted, or seriously threatened, at any stage of the operations.
Between the Blue Ridge and the Potomac the surface is diversified by hills and valleys, terminating in the bluffs which mark the western bank of the Potomac and the northern bank of the Rappahannock Rivers. The country is generally wooded with timber of second growth, standing so closely as to constitute nearly always an obstacle to the movement of troops, and, at times, to preclude their passage. The principle roads of this region follow the tributaries of the Potomac in a generally southeasterly course; the cross or country roads connecting these, and running north and south, are narrow and tortuous, difficult to use at all times and, after rains, almost impracticable. It is important to remember this, for it was chiefly by these narrow and difficult roads that the Army of the Potomac was required to move prior to its crossing of the river; after the crossing had been effected it was placed more nearly upon an equal footing with its antagonist in respect to the character of the roads over which it passed. It is proper to say, also that the generally fair weather of June minimized the disadvantage under which General Hooker's operations were conducted on the south bank of the Potomac.
For the purposes of this discussion the strength of the opposing armies, a question which has been much debated, is a matter of no importance; it is only proper to say that the cavalry of either army was of about the same strength - rather less than 9,000 sabres; these numbers, however, were subject to daily fluctuation, but constant diminution, due to the same cause - loss of horses in campaign.
On June 3rd, 1863, the three corps of infantry composing the Army of Northern Virginia were encamped along the south bank of the Rappahannock, on a line extending from the fortified position at Fredericksburg to the east and southeast as far as Hamilton's Crossing. From the Confederate left, the fords of the upper Rappahannock were observed and held by Stuart's cavalry, the main part of which was bivouacked in the open between Culpeper Court House and Brandy Station. The Federal infantry still occupied its cantonments at Falmouth. To the right and somewhat to the rear, the cavalry corps under General Pleasonton was massed at Warrenton Junction, charged with the duty maintaining a line of outposts extending from a point on the north bank of the Rappahannock, near Falmouth, to the west and northwest as far as Warrenton. From time to time small bodies of Federal cavalry were pushed into the country between the Orange and Alexandria railway and the upper Rapidan, a northern affluent of the Rappahannock, to check the operations of partisan corps, and to give timely information of any movements of the enemy in that quarter.
The Army of Northern Virginia was put in motion on June 3rd, just one month from the opening of the Chancellorsville campaign. Lee's first objective point was Culpeper Court House, a centre from which two systems of roads diverge; one to the northeast leading to Manassas, Fairfax, and Alexandria, the other to the northwest, leading to the Shenandoah Valley. Leaving Hill's corps to occupy the lines at Fredericksburg, the corps of Ewell and Longstreet were put in motion towards Culpeper, which was reached by Longstreet's advance on the evening of June 7th; by nightfall of the 8th, Longstreet was joined by Ewell. This first halting place was well chosen for two reasons; some time would be required for the fact to be discovered that two corps had been transferred to Culpeper, and it would then be open to doubt whether the next movement of the Confederates would be in the direction of Centreville or the Shenandoah Valley. The movement to this point had been covered by Stuart's cavalry - it was to be discovered, if possible, by Federal cavalry under Pleasonton.
Lee's intentions were accurately suspected by General Hooker who, on June 6th, directed Pleasonton to make a reconnaissance in force in the direction of Culpeper, with a view to ascertain whether any Confederate infantry had yet arrived in that vicinity. The problem before General Pleasonton was to ascertain whether the Confederate army, or any considerable portion of it, was moving, or had moved on the road between Fredericksburg and Culpeper. If such a movement was in progress, he was to ascertain something as to its state of forwardness. Has one corps, or more, reached Culpeper? Was any force in motion to the west or north of that place, and, if so, what force and with what apparent destination?
Before crossing to the south bank of the Rappahannock General Pleasonton divided his force into three columns. One, which he accompanied, composed of Buford's Division of cavalry, supported by Ames's Brigade of infantry, was to cross at Beverly Ford, and move by St. James Church and Gee's House to Brandy Station. The second, composed of Gregg's and Duffie's Divisions of cavalry supported by Russell's Brigade of infantry was to cross at Kelly's Ford and move to the crossing of Mountain Run where it was to separate, Gregg's Division moving by the direct road past Mount Dumpling to Brandy Station, while Duffie's Division was to make a more circuitous route to Stevensburg and beyond. Each of the columns encountered the enemy, attacking him successively in point of time, from right to left, the right column under Buford being the first to engage, followed at short intervals by Gregg and Duffie. I shall not enter into details of this remarkable engagement, which is worthy of being made the subject of a separate tactical study; for it is with the operations of these columns, as gatherers of information as to Lee's movements, that I propose to deal. Buford and Gregg had encountered the cavalry of the enemy which had been supported and relieved by his infantry towards the close of the day.
To what extent or in what force that infantry had appeared on the field was not accurately known. It was fair therefore to infer, from these operations, that an infantry force of the enemy was in the vicinity of Culpeper. Duffie, who had crossed and recrossed the road by which the corps of Longstreet and Ewell had passed, did not examine the road to verify that, or, if he did, made no report of the result of his examination. It is claimed in behalf of General Pleasanton that a part of Stuart's headquarters baggage was captured early in the day, in which certain papers were found disclosing the purpose of Confederate movement, and proving beyond doubt, that Lee's army was on its way to the Shenandoah Valley.
This claim, though accepted by the Comte de Paris, is stoutly denied by Stuart's friends. It would certainly have been a remarkable circumstance if so prudent a man as General Lee had formulated his intentions at so early a period of the campaign; it is still more remarkable that he should have entrusted them, in writing, to even a trusted subordinate. Is such dispatches or memoranda were found and transmitted to General Hooker, they certainly did not clear his mind as to the intentions of the enemy, since he admits that there was great uncertainty as to those intentions on the 12th and even so late as the 21st of June.
It must be admitted, therefore, that the movement of the Federal cavalry on Brandy Station had not been fruitful of results in the shape of information as to the movements of the enemy; it had shown, however, that such information was to be obtained by a bold, well-directed and energetic quest. It was and object lesson, moreover, in a new stratigical employment of the arm, which the leaders of the Federal cavalry were not slow in learning.
We have see that the corps of Ewell and Longstreet had succeeded in reaching Culpeper on June 8tha and 9th. Hill's corps, which had been left in the lines at Fredericksburg, was withdrawn on June 14th and reached Culpeper on the following day. Hooker, in order to conform to the movements of the enemy, established the 3rd Corps on the north bank of the Rappahannock on June 11th, in a line extending between Beverly Ford and Rappahannock Station. On the following day the 1st and 11th Corps were ordered, the b\former to Bealeton, and the latter to Catlett's Station on the Orange and Alexandria Railway. These three corps constituted the right wing of the Army of the Potomac, and General Reynolds was assigned to command the whole. These movements were made with the double purpose of confronting Lee in his new position, and of covering Washington from a repetition of Jackson's maneuvers of the preceding year.
The initiative in the next movement rested with General Lee. His first objective had been Culpeper, his second was to be the fords of the upper Potomac. A reference to the map ill show two ranges of mountains crossing the theatre of operations from northeast to southwest and distant from each other upon an average of fifteen miles. Between these ranges lies the Loudoun Valley; to the west of the Blue Ridge lies the valley of the Shenandoah. The eastern ranges crosses the Potomac a the Point of Rocks, the western at Harpers Ferry. Below the Point of Rocks, the Potomac is rarely fordable; above Harper's Ferry the fords are numerous and practicable, especially in the summer. Both ranges are pierced by frequent gaps or passes which, though generally practicable for troops of all arms, are easily defended, and are thus susceptible of being converted into efficient military obstacles. Such being the topographical situation, General Lee determined to pass the larger part of his infantry and artillery by way of the valley of the Shenandoah. The ranges of mountains on the right of his column would thus constitute a screen, concealing his main movement from the observation of the enemy. But the mountain ranges alone, however well they may have been situated for that purpose, were not to be his sole reliance in screening his march, for, as we shall presently see, the Loudoun Valley and the passes connecting it with the region to the east were to be watched and held by Stuart, supported, if need be, by Longstreet's corps of confederate infantry. From his left flank, in this northward march, General Lee had little to fear. He therefore disposed his columns for the march in the following order.
On the morning of the 10th, Ewell's corps was put in motion for the Shenandoah, via Springville, Gaines's Cross Roads, and Flint Hill. Hill and Longstreet were to follow, the latter by the Loudoun Valley; partly, as we have seen, to support Stuart, and partly to lead the enemy to believe that Manassas and Centreville were the real objectives. On the 12th the head of Ewell's column passed through Chester Gap and reached the Shenandoah at Cedarville. Jenkins's Brigade of cavalry accompanied Ewell, and Imboden's Brigade of the same arm joined him in the valley; the former covering the head and the latter the left flank of the advancing column. After passing the Blue Ridge at Chester Gap, Rodes's Division preceded by Jenkins's cavalry, was detached to attack and destroy McReynolds's Brigade of Federal infantry, which as posted at Berryville, about twelve miles east of Winchester. The rest of Ewell's corps continued, via Stevensburg and Kernstown to Winchester.
The military district of which Winchester id the centre was commanded by General Milroy. His command was independent of that of General Hooker, and he was not informed by either Hooker, Halleck, or his own cavalry, of the rapid advance of Ewell's column, and it was not until late on the 12th that he was made aware of his danger.1
The result need hardly be stated. A commander who expects the President of the Unites States, or the commanding general of the army to do his outpost work form him, is not likely to find that personage a sufficient substitute for a vigilant and enterprising cavalry. Indeed, it may perhaps be questioned whether General Halleck, from his office in Washington, was able to render Milroy as efficient service in this respect as he might have gotten from the mounted portion of his own command, who were entirely familiar with the country, and only needed a direction and supervision which he was unable or incompetent to bestow, to have given timely notice of the impending danger.
It is worthy of remark, as an evidence of the extreme slowness with which the lessons of defeat were learned in West Virginia, that the same state of affairs was repeated during the advance of General Early into the Shenandoah Valley in July of the following year. Then, as now, the stable door was locked after the horse had been stolen, and General Sigel followed General Milroy into deserved retirement only when he had demonstrated his want of capacity to conduct the simplest and most elementary of the operations of war. On the evening of June 13th, Ewell reached Winchester, and on the 14th inflicted a crushing defeat upon Milroy, whom he compelled to abandon his artillery and trains and to retire in great confusion upon Hancock and Harper's Ferry. Having done this, Ewell resumed his route, with Jenkins's and Imboden's cavalry in front and flank, toward Williamsport, the place appointed by the Confederate commander for the crossing of the Potomac.
While General Lee had no intention of entering the region between Warrenton and Fairfax, in which he had operated so successfully the previous summer, he was not unwilling to lead Hooker to believe that an invasion of that territory was among the possibilities of the existing campaign. To that end Longstreet was moved from Culpeper on June 15th, with orders to enter the Loudoun Valley and appear to threaten Leesburg, returning, when that object had been accomplished, by Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps. As this manoeuvre would bring him within east striking distance of the Federal advance under Reynolds, Stuart was directed to mask the movement of Longstreet by placing his cavalry in front and on the right flank of the infantry column. To perform this duty effectively it was necessary to occupy and hold Aldie and Thoroughfare Gaps. These are two central passes through the Bull Run Mountains; through the former runs the main road from Winchester to Alexandria; by the latter the Manassas Gap railway gains an entrance to the Loudoun Valley.
Stuart, on June 15th, pushed forward to occupy Aldie and Thoroughfare Gaps, assigning to Chambliss, temporarily commanding the Brigade of W. H. F. Lee, the task of occupying the former, and to Colonel Munford, who at the moment commanded the Brigade of Fitz Hugh Lee that of occupying the latter. Robertson's Brigade was directed to Rectortown, a point in the upper Loudoun Valley, from which he could reinforce either Chambliss or Munford should occasion arrive. The Brigades of Jones and Hampton were left to guard the fords of the Rappahannock and cover the march of Hill from Fredericksburg to the valley of Shenandoah.
Munford, moving by Salem, Piedmont, and Upperville reached Middleburg on June 17th, and halted between that town and Aldie, pushing his outposts, however, through the pass to the eastern slope of the mountains. As there seemed to be no prospect of a Federal advance by way of Warrenton and the upper courses of the Rapidan, Robertson was withdrawn, on the 17th, from Rectortown to Middleburg. On the same day Chambliss was withdrawn from Thoroughfare Gap, and on the 18th he to arrived at Middleburg.
We have seen that the tree corps constituting the right wing of the Army of the Potomac, under Reynolds, had been moved on June 13th to Bealeton and Catlett's Station. On the same day the cavalry of that army was massed at Warrenton Junction. Ewell's attack on Milroy at Winchester, on June 14th, had proved that a very considerable force on Confederate infantry was on its way to the crossings of the upper Potomac, and it now became necessary for General Hooker to so dispose his force as to conform to the probable intentions of the enemy. to that end the several corps moved to their right rear, between June 14th and 17th, and arranged in two lines, the first composed of the 1st, 3rd, 5th and the 11th Corps occupying the line between Herndon's Station , on the Loudoun and Hampshire railway, and Manassas Junction; the second, composed of the 2nd, 6th and 12th Corps, occupying a line extending from Fairfax Courthouse due south to the Occoquan. The movements of the Federal infantry was covered by Pleasonton, and it had hardly been completed when Hooker determined to employ his cavalry in a bold attempt to push through to the Shenandoah, if need be, to obtain some definite information as to the strength and purposes of the enemy.
On the 17th, Pleasonton was directed to the vicinity of Aldie to pass the gap and ascertain what the enemy was doing in the Loudoun Valley and beyond. He was supported in this undertaking by Barnes's Division of the 5th Army Corps. He took with him Buford's and Gregg's Divisions, detaching Duffie, with a single regiment to make a detour by Thoroughfare Gap and the western slope of the Bull Run Mountain to Middleburg. It was Pleasonton's purpose to force his way across the Loudoun Valley to Ashby's Gap in the Blue Ridge; for it was only by reaching that point that he could obtain any reliable information of the Confederate forces in the valley of the Shenandoah. For want of time, these operations will not be discussed in detail.
Stuart undertook to defend, first, the line of the Bull Run Mountains, then to contest the passage of the Loudoun Valley, and, finally, to prevent the gaps of the Blue Ridge from being pierced. In this he was not successful, and was steadily forced back to Ashby's Gap in the Blue Ridge, in the defence of which he was obliged to call upon General Longstreet for infantry support. Pleasonton's success in the engagements at Aldie, Middleburg and Upperville had been most encouraging; the more as they were calculated to inspire both officers and men of his command with confidence in their capacity to cope, on equal terms with their redoubtable adversary.
In a series of encounters, covering a period of five days, -- between June 17th and 21st, -- he had succeeded in reaching the base of the Blue Ridge at Ashby's Gap. Partly from the observations of his scouts and partly from the stubborn character of Stuart's resistance, he had ascertained the genera fact that the mass of Lee's infantry was moving northward through the Shenandoah Valley. He does not seem to have learned, however, that Longstreet's corps had entered the Loudoun Valley, or that it had passed through Ashby's and Snickers Gaps into the valley of Virginia. This was due, however, in part to the very impotence of the movement as a demonstration, and in part to the fact that the operation had been so successfully screened by General Stuart to prevent even the bare knowledge of its existence from reaching General Hooker. It is difficult to see that it operated to delay his crossing of the Potomac for a single day.
On June 15th, in pursuance of Genera Lee's plan to appear to threaten Leesburg, General Longstreet advanced along the eastern slope3s of the Blue Ridge, though Fauquier and Loudoun Counties. On June 19th his divisions were posted in the following order: McLaws at Ashby's Gap, Hood in Snicker's Gap, with Pickett in support of Hood and McLaws. To Pickett was also assigned the task of covering a number of minor openings or passes in the Blue Ridge, through which small parties of observation might have been able to penetrate. On June 20th General Longstreet received instructions to hold himself in readiness to move in the direction of the Potomac, with a view to a crossing. He therefore withdrew his infantry from its positions in the passes to the west bank of the Shenandoah. He continued, however to hold the ferries opposite the gaps which had been occupied, and stood read to support Stuart in the event of support being called for by that officer. Such, indeed, proved to be the case, and a brigade of infantry was sent to Stuart's assistance late in the afternoon of June 21st, which followed the retirement of Pleasonton from Ashby's Gap on the morning of the June 22nd. This done, Longstreet's corps passed rapidly to the Potomac. A crossing was effected at Williamsport on June 25th and 26th an, on June 27th, Longstreet joined Hill in the vicinity of Chambersburg.
Hill's corps which had been the last to leave the lines at Fredericksburg, and which had no more prominent part than that of walking gentlemen the the second stage of the campaign, was now moved from Culpeper by way of Hazel River and Flint Hill to the Shenandoah, and down the valley of that stream to Shepherdstown where a crossing of the Potomac was effected on June 24th. Without halting it advanced at once into Pennsylvania and reached the general rendezvous at Chambersburg on June 27th.
During the few days which were consumed by General Longstreet in his demonstration, General Hooker who was in close communication with General Halleck in Washington, gives no indication of having obtained any specific knowledge of the fact that Longstreet had entered the Loudoun Valley, or, indeed, that there was any considerable force of the enemy's infantry nearer his front than the valley of the Shenandoah. The existence of such knowledge, however, would not have materially affected the disposition of his forces, since his policy was in general defensive, and his attitude one of expectancy rather than aggressiveness. It requires but little in the way of argument to show that General Hooker's policy in this regard was both wise and prudent. It was so, in the first place, because General Lee hoped to draw him toward the Shenandoah Valley, and was disappointed at his failure to do so. In the next place, let us see what would have been the probable result of such an undertaking. If at any time after June 15th or 16th, when Longstreet abandoned the passes of the Blue Ridge, he had advanced boldly in the direction of the Shenandoah, as he was not only advised but urged to do by the President, he would have encountered, first Stuart in the passes of the Bull Run Mountains, next Longstreet in the passes of the Blue Ridge, with Hill in supporting distance; and, finally, the main body of the Confederate army in the valley of the Shenandoah. He might, it is true, have succeeded in placing himself across Genera lee's line of communications, and in such a way as to offer defensive battle in a position of his own choosing. But this undertaking would have been difficult in the extreme, and would have been in substance a repetition of the manoeuvre at Chancellorsville, and there is no reason to suppose that his handling of the army in such a situation would have been less irresolute or more skilful than it had been during the brief but disastrous venture across the Rappahannock in May. Finally, the least mistake or failure in strategy on General Hooker's part would have given General Lee an opportunity to manoeuvre the Army of the Potomac back toward Centreville and Washington; a form of military endeavor in which he had displayed great skill during the Virginia campaign of 1862, and in which he was to display still greater skill, a few months later, in the Mine Run campaign of 1863.
After dispersing the garrisons of Winchester, Berryville, and Martinsburg, General Ewell continued his march to the Potomac. Rodes's Division crossed at Williamsport on the afternoon of the 15th and established itself in the vicinity of Hagerstown on the 19th; Johnson's Division crossed at Boteler's Ford near Sharpsburg and encamped on the battlefield of Antietam; Jenkins's Cavalry Brigade was pushed forward to Chambersburg for Forage and provisions, and, these dispositions having been made, General Ewell allowed his command to rest until the 22nd, when having been joined by Early's Division which had been detached to threaten Harper's Ferry, and the corps of Hill and Longstreet having arrived within supporting distance, it entered upon the next stage of the operation -- the invasion proper of Pennsylvania.
I think it will be admitted that General Ewell's conduct of the advance of the Army of Northern Virginia up to his point had been most skilful. The march had been rapidly prosecuted, two important posts had been captured, another had been seriously threatened, and still, by the timely halt in the vicinity of Sharpsburg and Hagerstown Ewell's forces had been kept in hand, within reasonable supporting distance of Longstreet and Hill, had General Hooker attempted to enter the Shenandoah Valley or threaten the Confederate lines of communication; finally, a matter of the utmost importance, the ultimate destination of the army had not been disclosed.
Apart from the management of the head of the column, there is much to commend in the general conduct of the movement, especially in its second phase, the march from Culpeper to the upper Potomac; and this in spite of the fact that it had failed to induce Hooker to advance in the direction of the Shenandoah. Although the column was to all appearance, dangerously extended over many miles of country, so much so indeed as to give occasion for the remark of Mr. Lincoln that2 "if the head of General Lee's army was at Martinsburg and the tail of it on the plank road between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim somewhere," it's marches had, in fact, been so carefully calculated and its movements so skilfully screened, that an attempt on General Hooker's part to break through could not have been made without giving an opportunity for the scattered forces of the Confederacy to concentrate for battle.
Having initiated a manoeuvre which was calculated to cause, and did cause General Hooker to cross to the Maryland shore with his entire army, General Lee seems to have become doubtful as to his capacity to deal with so large a force of the enemy as was likely to be opposed to him in Maryland and Pennsylvania. With a view, therefore, to detain some portion of the Army of the Potomac on the south bank of the river, or to cause its recall to Virginia, he conceived the plan of assembling a force at Culpeper Court House for the double purpose of threatening Washington and protecting his own lines of communications which had already become dangerously extended. With a view to give immediate importance to the demonstration, General Lee recommended that General Beauregard be recalled from Charleston and placed in command of such forces as could be hastily assembled at Culpeper. This project was urgently pressed upon Mr. Davis's attention in at least four communications between June 22nd and 25th. "I think it important" he says3 "that, whatever troops be used for the purpose I have named, General Beauregard be placed in command. His presence would give magnitude to even a small demonstration, and tend greatly to perplex and confound the enemy." Again4 on June 25th, still apparently, fearing a concentration of Federal troops, "if the plan I suggested the other day, of organizing an army, even in effigy, under General Beauregard at Culpeper Court House can be carried into effect much relief will be afforded." In the urgency of these requests it is not difficult to see an expression of of regret at the failure of the demonstration under General Longstreet to secure the results upon which the Confederate commander seems to have confidently reckoned.
If we regard the second stage of the campaign as having terminated on June 22nd, when General Ewell's corps had established itself on the north bank of the Potomac, with Longstreet and Hill within supporting distance, it seems to me quite clear that General Lee's strategy is fairly open to this criticism. Assuming that his intention was to draw the Army of the Potomac to the north bank of the river, the operation of Ewell was well calculated to produce that result; but the strictly contemporaneous movement of Longstreet could not have failed to produce the very opposite effect, and must have operated to delay the crossing which General Lee so ardently desired. Indeed, the two forces being applied at the same time and in opposite direction ought to have operated to prevent the enemy, during the period of their joint application, from doing anything at all. Such was the result in fact, and General Hooker, during this period simply held his army in hand, covering Washington from the west, but read to pass the Potomac quickly when the moment for such crossing should arrive.
In the next stage of the campaign, the invasion proper of Pennsylvania, the advance was again entrusted to General Ewell. The force actively participating in this operation consisted of Ewell's corps of infantry and Jenkins's and Imboden's brigades of cavalry, and the movement began on June 22nd; so soon, indeed, as Hill and Longstreet had come within supporting distance. Two divisions of infantry, preceded by Jenkins's cavalry brigade, moved up the Cumberland valley to Carlisle, halting one day at Chambersburg en route. This portion of the command reached Carlisle on June 27th. General Ewell's instructions, which were delivered to him on June 22nd, were those appropriate to the undertaking upon which he was to be employed. He was to penetrate into the region between Carlisle and the Susquehanna, and if the city of Harrisburg came within range of his endeavor, it was to be captured.
Early's Division, accompanied by White's cavalry command, moved on a road parallel to that taken by the main body, with a view to protect the right flank of the column and cover the passes into the Cumberland valley. At Greenwood, a short distance to the east of Chambersburg he passed to the east side of the mountains, under instructions to extend the operations of the invasion to the fertile agricultural district on the lower courses of the Susquehanna. Gettysburg was entered and passed on the 26th, Berlin on the 27th, and York was reached on the 28th. From this point Gordon was detached and pushed forward to the Susquehanna at Wrightsville, where a small force of militia was believed to be; Gordon's approach caused the destruction of the important railroad bridge at Columbia.
The news of Hooker's crossing of the Potomac, which had been completed on the 26th, reached General Lee on the 27th, and caused Ewell's immediate recall; either the significance of this movement was not fully appreciated by General Lee, or he wished to draw General Hooker still further to the east, for, on July 29th, he again directed General Ewell to push on in the direction of Harrisburg. This order was immediately recalled, however, and Ewell was directed to concentrate his command at Cashtown, to which point Early's Division was also directed. The second order gave Ewell a route east of the mountains, but left the details of march to the discretion of that officer.
To General Hooker, who had advanced to Frederick, the movement up to this point must have indicated an intention on the part of the enemy to occupy the line of the South Mountain, or to use that range as a screen behind which his subsequent operations could be masked. And in this view of the case he would hot have been far from truth. Indeed, from the very beginning of the campaign, General Lee seems to have had it constantly in mind to use the line of South Mountain for the purpose above suggested, and I can find no evidence of any intention on his part, up to this time, to cross that range for the purpose of giving or receiving battle on its eastern slope. Portions of his command might pass to the east of the mountain, but for a temporary purpose and always in such order as to leave the way open for a prompt withdrawal, should the enemy approach too closely or operate in such a manner as to threaten his communications with the Cumberland Valley or with the upper crossings of the Potomac, which he could not permit to be compromised for an instant under any consideration.
The retirement of Stuart from the line of the Blue Ridge and the advance of Ewell's infantry into Pennsylvania having removed all doubt from General Hooker's mind as to the intentions of General Lee, the main body of the Army of the Potomac passed to the north bank of the river, on June 25th and 26th, by pontoon bridges, which had been constructed for that purpose at Edwards' Ferry. On the 27th the 6th Corps crossed to the north bank and General Hooker advanced to the passes of South Mountain. Here the alternative was offered him of entering the Cumberland Valley and placing himself upon the enemy's line of communications, or of keeping to the east of that range with a view to lengthen the enemy's lines of operation and to engage any part of his force that could be drawn in that direction. the former would hav protected Harper's Ferry, obtained the services of its garrison, and compelled General Lee to turn back an d offer battle, or attempt to repass into Virginia by the crossings of the upper Potomac. The latter plan promised to preserve his own lines of supply, which were never seriously threatened, and would be calculated to prevent the entrance of the enemy into the rich agricultural region lying between the Catoctin Mountains and the Susquehanna. The latter course was finally chosen, not altogether wisely, and the Army of the Potomac began to advance along the eastern base of the South Mountain. It is worthy of remark that, in all of these operations, General Hooker's army was handled with the greatest certainty and skill. No unnecessary movements were undertaken, no time was lost in useless manoeuvres, and the marches were well planned and skilfully executed; the several corps were held well in hand and were moved always at the proper time, with the greatest precision, and with a minimum of delay and confusion.
In the general movement of the Confederate army down the Shenandoah Valley, and across the Potomac into Maryland and Pennsylvania it was General Lee's intention that Stuart should maintain a position on the right flank of the infantry column. The first stage of the operation, the screening of the march to the Potomac, had been completed on June 22nd, but the necessity for his presence on that flank of the army remained as imperative as ever; the more as the armies would begin to approach each other so soon as the Federal army passed to the north bank of the Potomac. In the performance of this difficult and important duty Stuart, who had operated thus far in co-operation with General Longstreet, was left a wide discretion. It was necessary that this should be so, for the task to which he was about to address himself was beset with peculiar difficulty.
To understand this difficulty it will be necessary to consider for a moment the actual theatre of operations. Stuart's orders required him to keep the right of the Confederate infantry. That infantry was marching in a long column, the head of which was in Pennsylvania, the rear in the lower courses of the Shenandoah. East of the Blue Ridge, and separated from General Lee by the narrow Loudoun and Catoctin Valleys, the country was occupied by the Army of the Potomac. The fords of the Potomac, from Harper's Ferry to the west, were reserved for the passage of the infantry, artillery and trains; from Harper's Ferry to the south, beyond Edwards' Ferry, they were controlled by the enemy. There were then but two courses open to Stuart; to cross at Shepherdstown, keeping to the right and rear of Longstreet, or to cross the Potomac below Hooker, and attempt to join the right of the Confederate Army in Pennsylvania. The latter course was one which he favored and advocated in at least three communications to General Lee.
The propriety of this movement has been much discussed. Assuming that the movement in the direction of Harrisburg would draw Hooker so far to the eastward as to make it unnecessary, for a few days, to screen the right flank of the Army of Northern of Virginia -- an assumption not justified by the strategic situation -- the wisdom of the movement must depend upon the certainty of Stuart's being able to resume his place when his command again became necessary for outpost service. If operations in the vicinity of the Susquehanna were contemplated, a glance at the map will show that York and Harrisburg could be reached by a route, in the rear of the Army of the Potomac, as short as that along the eastern base of South Mountain. If, on the other hand, it was not in contemplation to do more than merely threaten the Susquehanna valley by a detachment from the main body of Lee's army -- as actually proved to be the case -- then York was not Stuart's true objective, and he should not have been permitted to place himself at so great distance from his proper theatre of activity, the territory lying between the main bodies of the opposing armies.
There was much, however, to be said in favor of the undertaking. The Maryland roads were certainly better than those used by the infantry, and the moral effect upon the authorities in Washington could be confidently reckoned upon. There was no time during the progress of the war when the approach of a partisan force of insignificant numbers did not occasion great concern and alarm; if such an effect followed the incursion of a force of less than a hundred men, why might not Stuart count upon a correspondingly increased effect to follow the news that he had interposed the greater part of his command between the Army of the Potomac and Washington? In this he was not mistaken, and General Lee so far concurred with him as to approve General Stuart's proposal and order him to carry it into effect. The sound military objections to the project were either not apparent to General Stuart, or were outweighed in his mind by the apparent brilliancy of the undertaking. To the success of his endeavor time and the utmost celerity of movement were absolutely necessary; but these were the uncertain elements in the problem before him. He would have to pass thro9ugh or evade the columns of Federal infantry which were converging upon Frederick, and his recent experiences with the Federal cavalry had not warranted the belief that it was less ably commanded or less skilfully handled than his own.
As the event proved, these elements entered as cause of delay, preventing that junction with General Lee in the days just preceding the battle which that officer so ardently desired, and the failure of which he so deeply regretted. it must be said, however, that he eluded successfully the numerous detachments that were set in motion to intercept him; he created such consternation in the minds of the authorities in Washington as to cause the telegraph wires to fairly but with the orders and appeals that were sent, in every direction, to fall upon him or drive him out of Maryland. He captured a number of wagons and a quantity of supplies, the loss of which was not felt in the Federal army. But he exhausted the strength of his men and animals in a long, tedious and useless march; he gained no information of any practical value to General Lee; and he was absent from the army at a time when his skill, enterprise, and ability would have enabled him to render most important services to the Confederate cause, services which I need hardly say no other commander was capable of rendering.
On June 27th the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac were at Frederick. Three of the seven corps were at or near the point, three were at Middletown, and one at Knoxville in the direction of Harper's Ferry. During the course of the day a controversy between General Hooker and Halleck, in respect to the retention of a garrison at Harper's Ferry, which had been maintained for several days became somewhat acrimonious and culminated in a request on the part of the former to be relieved from his command. This request was instantly complied with, under circumstances indicating that the difference of view upon the subject of abandoning Harper's Ferry furnished rather an occasion than a reason for making a change in the general command.
General George G. Mead, the commander of the Fifth Army Corps, was assigned to the office thus vacated, and was himself succeeded by General George Sykes; General Hancock having been assigned to the command of the Second Crops a few days before, vice Couch, who had been given command of the new Department of the Susquehanna; both of these assignments of corps commanders greatly strengthened the hands of General Meade in the difficult operations which now confronted him. It is a tribute to the character and capacity of the new commander of the army, and of his entire loyalty to the policy of his predecessor, that he mad not the slightest change in the plans, organization, or staff of the army; he found this great machine in excellent order and working to its highest capacity, and he simply kept it in full and vigorous operation.
Although the movement of invasion had practically spent its force, it still seemed to Gneral Meade to be in the full tide of activity; and his first duty appeared to be to move still farther to the east toward the Susquehanna, so as to be able to interpose between the enemy and Baltimore, if he continued his advance in that direction, or to attack him as he returned from the Susquehanna should a favorable occasion present itself. To that end the several corps which on the 28th ere still in the vicinity of Frederick, were directed on the 29th to a line extending from Westminster to Emmitsburg. On the 20th the left wing under Reynolds advanced in the direction of Emmitsburg and Gettysburg; the centre and right being still further advanced, pivoting on the left, in such a way as to cause to the army to occupy a line from Emmitsburg to Manchester. The headquarters were established at Taneytown; and, on this day, General Meade caused an examination to be made of a position on Pipe Creek, near that town, with a view to its selection as a place for defensive battle.
I have signally failed to understand the operation of this campaign, as indicated by the movements directed by the commanders of the opposing armies, if I have given any support to the view that a aconcentr4ation for battle as Gettysburg, or at any other point to the east of the mountains, was contemplated by General Lee as any time up to noon of July 1st. Certainly no one at all familiar with General Lee's methods can reconcile his cautious handling of his command with a design to pass the mountains and engage the enemy in the open country to the east. Had he cherished such an intention, he would have advanced boldly into the disputed area, studied its tactical and stratigical capabilities by actual personal observation, and either delivered a blow, or manoeuvered in such a way as to compel the enemy to attack him in a position of his own choosing. On the other hand, the operations actually undertaken by him indicate a purpose on his part to keep the main body of the army west of the mountains. Early's Division had passed to the east of South Mountain to accomplish a definite purpose, that purpose being to extend the area of invasion sufficiently eastward; first, to cause Hooker to cross the river, and second, to draw the enemy such a distance to the eastward as would assure the integrity of this own line of communications. With the same end in view, Ewell himself had been directed upon Harrisburg, but was recalled when it became necessary to concentrate for battle the forces which had been scattered to subsist. And that concentration was ordered, not at Gettysburg, but at Cashtown, a point considerably nearer the mountains, but still sufficiently advanced to furnish a rallying point for the detached commands of Ewell and Early, and cover their withdrawal into the Cumberland Valley.
This order reached Ewell early on the 29th. He immediately recalled Early, put his command into motion, Johnson taking the road to the west, and Rodes that to the east of South Mountain, and reached Heidlersburg with Rodes's Division on the evening of the 30th. During the night of the 30th he received orders from the commanding general to concentrate at Cashtown or Gettysburg, as circumstances might dictate, and a note form A. P. Hill saying that he was at Cashtown. This was an assurance that Hill was in position to cover the retirement of that portion of the army that had passed to the east of the mountains. On the evening of the 29th, Early being at York, received a copy of a note from General Lee, accompanied by verbal instructions which required him to retrace his steps and "rejoin the army the the west side of South Mountain." On the evening of the 30th Early encamped within three miles of Heidlersburg, and rode in to the town to report to General Ewell, by whom he was instructed "that the object was to concentrate the corps at or near Cashtown," and he was therefore directed to move without delay to that point.5 I have thus far presented the testimony of the Confederate commanders who were conducting the only operations involving special difficulty or danger, and their testimony is clear. Their orders carried them, for the time, out of touch with the main body of the army, but with a clear understanding that they were eventually to rejoin the main body in the Cumberland Valley, and that their safe return was to be secured by the only means known to the art of war of accomplishing that purpose -- holding the pass by which that return was to be effected.
In attempting to show that the concentration at Gettysburg was not deliberately planned by General Lee, I do not go so far as to say that a battle was not fought at that place on the the first three days of July, 1863. Indeed, I will now undertake to show how the battle was brought about. It has been seen that Hill and Longstreet had halted in the vicinity of Chambersburg on June 27; Longstreet in the immediate neighborhood of the town, Hill at Fayetteville, a few miles to the east on the road to Cashtown. Hill's orders, as stated in his report, required him to move in the direction of York, and operation connection with Ewell; but they were by no means urgent, and were executed in a very leisurely manner. His leading division under Heth reached Cashtown on the 29th. Pender encamped on the 30th at the western entrance to the pass, and reached Cashtown at 8 o'clock A.M. on the 1st of July, and Gettysburg on the afternoon of the same day; Anderson left Fayetteville after daylight on July 1, reached Cashtown in the afternoon, and arrived at Gettysburg after the first day's battle was over. Longstreet followed still more deliberately, leaving Pickett to cover the retirement from Chambersburg, and found his way so seriously obstructed by the commands and supply trains which had preceded him that he was only able to reach Marsh Run with his leading division at nine P.M. of the 1st, and with his second division at midnight of the same day. If this was a concentration at Gettysburg which was determined upon in advance, its execution bears no evidence of forethought, or of the skill which had thus far characterized General Lee's conduct of the operations of the campaign.
The actual contact at Gettysburg came about in this way. Heth's Division, which was the first to cross the mountains, reached Cashtown on the evening of the 29th. Hearing that shoes were to be had at Gettysburg, an article of which the Confederate armies stood always in need, Pettigrew's Brigade was sent to that place on the morning of the 30th, in quest of shoes. On approaching the town he encountered the advance of Buford's Division of Federal Cavalry and halted; having neither desire nor authority to engage the enemy, Pettigrew retraced his steps to Cashtown. General Hill, who, meantime had reached Cashtown, received Pettigrew's report, and, believing that there was still some substance in the shoe rumor, he authorized Heth to repeat the experiment on the following day. As Heth approached the town on the morning of July 1st, which still presented evidences of Federal occupation, he deployed his lines, and soon developed Buford's entire division. Buford, who covered the advance of the Army of the Potomac, and who had been strongly impressed with the strategic importance of the place, strongly resisted Heth's advance, and called upon Reynolds for support. This was quickly afforded him, and as a result, the engagement of the first day was rapidly developed. I cannot find in this state of facts any indication of an intention on the part of General Lee wither to occupy the town or to concentrate there for battle. It's occupation was certainly not ordered by him, nor can I find any good military reason for the advance of General Hill on the morning of July 1st.
That a result justifying the quest could have been hoped for, in a town which had been visited and levied upon by Gordon's barefooted Brigade, simply passes belief. In the light of the momentous consequences of his act, it would seem that an officer of General Hill's rank and experience should have paused in an undertaking not warranted by his instructions, and submitted the case to his superior; especially as he had an entire night at his disposal and that superior was within easy reach.
On the morning of July 1st, General Lee's entire army, with the exception of two divisions of Ewell's and Stuart's Cavalry, was either to the west of the mountains, or was so posted at the eastern entrance of the defile as to secure the retirement of Ewell. Stuart, though unable to assist in the undertaking, was as able to care for himself as he had been at any time within the week previous. Buford, with the cavalry advance of the Army of the Potomac, was at Gettysburg, but was not likely to advance in force during the day; his dispositions, apart from drawing attention to the importance of the position at Gettysburg, indicated an intention to examine the country between Cashtown and the gaps to the south, in the direction of Fairfield, and Reynolds's infantry was not likely to do more than reach Gettysburg during the day. In this view of the case, it was certainly not the part of wisdom for General Lee to cross the range in loose order, without a definite object, or for the mere purpose o fighting a battle with his back to the mountains which he had thus far been so careful to keep between himself and the enemy. His acceptance of the situation, created without forethought as to its consequences by General Hill, is as unaccountable as was his sudden resolution in September of the preceding year, to make a stand at Sharpsburg in a position, which, from every military point of view, was one in which to invite disaster.
We have seen how seriously General Lee was hampered in his operations by the absence of Stuart. General Meade suffered no such embarrassment. From the day upon which the Army of the Potomac left its cantonments on the Rappahannock until Reynolds relieved Buford's Cavalry Division on the battlefield of Gettysburg the Federal cavalry had performed its difficult and arduous duties with a resolution, intelligence, and efficiency which deserved and has received, the highest praise. It had kept in constant touch with Stuart; it had interposed to screen the movements of the army from the enemy, and had finally pushed through to the Shenandoah Valley and discovered the northward movement of the Confederate infantry. When the Army of the Potomac crossed into Maryland, one division had covered its front and the others the flanks of the advance into Pennsylvania. Two divisions under Gregg and Kilpatrick had been detached to deal with Stuart, and had contributed powerfully to minimize his undertaking and to delay his junction with the main body of Lee's army, leaving to Buford the duty of covering the advance which he was so thoroughly fitted to perform. Gregg and Kilpatrick continued to interpose between Stuart and the main body of the army, and finally took post, the former at noon on July 2nd, at a point on the Hanover Road about three miles to the east of Gettysburg, a position from which, on the morrow, he was to render a service to the Union cause hardly less important than that performed by Buford on the first day of the battle. Kilpatrick's Division, less Custer's Brigade, which remained with Gregg at Hunterstown, on the 2nd, after an encounter with Stuart's rear guard under Hampton, passed to the left rear of the army, where it remained until the close of the battle.
The information thus obtained and placed at the disposition of General Meade was of remarkable accuracy. On June 30th he gives to his corps commanders the following statement of the positions of the enemy. "From present information Longstreet and hill are at Chambersburg, partly toward Gettysburg; Ewell at Carlisle and York. Movements indicate a disposition to advance from Chambersburg to Gettysburg. he could not have bee more accurately informed if his knowledge had been received direct from the headquarters of the Confederate army.
General Meade's dispositions for June 30th indicate a belief on his part that the enemy would concentrate for battle somewhere to the eastward of the mountains, but precisely where, it was of course impossible for him to determine with even and approximation to accuracy. Reynolds reported early on the 30th that "if the enemy advances in force from Gettysburg, and we are to fight a defensive battle in this vicinity, the position to be occupied is just north of the town of Emmitsburg, covering the road to Taneytown."6 To this General Meade replies, at 11:30 A.M. of the same day, in the following language: "The enemy undoubtedly occupy the Cumberland Valley, from Chambersburg, in force; whether the holding of the Cashtown Gap is to prevent our entrance, or is their advance against us, remains to be seen.... In case of an advance in force against either you or Howard at Emmitsburg, you must fall back to that place and I will reinforce you from the corps nearest to you."
This clearly contemplated a withdrawal from, not an advance upon Gettysburg; and this view is confirmed by General Meade's orders of July 1st, in which detained instructions are communicated to the several corps commanders for a concentration on the Pipe Creek line in rear of Taneytown. This disposition of his command was not warranted by the existing situation, or by his knowledge of the movements of the enemy. it covered Baltimore, a place which was never seriously threatened, but uncovered the eastern slopes of the South Mountain, and would have enabled General Lee to withdraw behind the mountains at his leisure. It strengthened Meade's right which was never threatened, and weakened his left where he knew the main body of the enemy to be. The action of General Hill, however, was so timed as to save the Army of the Potomac from consequences of this error, and brought on the battle in a position as favorable to Meade as it was unfavorable to Lee.
With the management of the battle brought on, as we have seen, with no realizing sense of the momentous consequences which were to ensue, this paper has nothing to do; nor shall I discuss at this time the subsequent retirement of the Army of Northern Virginia to Williamsport and the south bank of the Potomac. Such a discussion would involve a consideration of the condition of the armies, the effects of the battle upon the troops engaged, and the possibility of success in an assault upon the Confederate army in a strong defensive position of his own choosing. We know how grievously disappointed Mr. Lincoln was at the escape of Lee's army. He is said to have asked to be informed of the name of the only corps commander who counselled an attack. From this pint of view the following letter from the corps commander in question -- General Howard -- will be of some interest:
HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH CORPS
NEAR BERLIN, July 18, 1863
A. Lincoln, President of the United States
Sir, --
Having noticed in the newspapers certain statements bearing upon the battle of Gettysburg and subsequent operations which I deem calculated to convey a wrong impression in your mind, I wish to submit a few statements. The successful issue of the battle of Gettysburg was due mainly to the energetic operations of our present commanding general prior to the engagement and to the manner in which he handled his troops on the field. The reserves have never before during the war been thrown in at just the right moment. In many cases when pints were just being carried by the enemy a regiment or brigade appeared, to stop his progress and hurl him back. Moreover, I have never seen a more hearty co-operation on the part of general officers as since Genera Meade took command. As to not attacking the enemy prior to his leaving his stronghold beyond the Antietam, it is by no means certain that the repulse of Gettysburg might not have been turned upon us. At any rate the commanding general was in favor of an immediate attack, but with the evident difficulties in our way, the uncertainty of a success, and the strong conviction of our best military minds against the risk, I must say that I think the general acted wisely. As to my request to make a reconnoissance on the morning of the 14th which the papers state was refused, the facts are that the general had required me to reconnoitre the evening before and give my opinion as to the practicability of making a lodgment on the enemy's left, and his answer to my subsequent request was that the movements he had already ordered would subserve the same purpose. We have, if I may be allowed to say it, a commanding general in whom all the officers with whom I have come in contact express complete confidence. I have said this much because of the censure and of the misrepresentations which have grown out of the escape of Lee's army.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant
O. O. Howard, Major-General
WASHINGTON, JULY 7, 1863.
HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:
Mr. President, --
After having complied with my instructions on being relieved of command of the Army of the Potomac, I came to Washington for the purpose of seeking an interview with yourself and the Secretary of War. this morning I have been placed in arrest by order of the major-general commanding the Army for visiting Washington without a pass. It is almost unnecessary for me to add that in my previous visits to this city this rule was never enforced in my case. Under the usages of service it s not considered proper to call on superior officers except with their consent, and I therefore request that His Excellency will have me informed whether or not he will grand me an audience for half an hour, and if so, appoint the time I can have the honor of meeting with him.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOSEPH HOOKER, Major-General
1 General Schenk, Baltimore: Get Milroy from Winchester to Harper's Ferry if Possible. He will be gobbled up if he remains, if he is not already past salvation. A. Lincoln.
2 43. W. R., 39.
3 45 W. R., 925.
4 45 W. R., 932.
5 General Early, whose command stood in the greatest danger of being interrupted in its march, gave to Colonel White, the commander of his cavalry, the following instructions: "Get between Gettysburg and Heidlersburg, and picket at Mummasburg and Hunterstown. Send in the direction of Gettysburg, and see what is there, and report to General Ewell at Heidlersburg. A small body of cavalry has made its appearance at between Gettysburg and Heidlersburg. See what it is. J. A. Early, Maj. Gen.
(The above dispatch was captured on the night of June 30th, on the road to Oxford, by a detachment from General Buford's command.)
The last word from General Lee himself, written on July 1st, probably before he became aware of the commencement of the battle, will be found in a dispatch to General Imboden, which closes with the significant words: "My headquarters fro the present will be at Cashtown, east of the mountains."
6 On June 30th, probably late in the day, General Reynolds telegraphs to General Howard, "I do not believe the report of their marching on Berlin, which would lead them directly to York. The enemy are evidently marching out into this valley, but whether it is for the purpose of going to York, or to give us battle I cannot say." On the same day General Meade, in giving the corps commanders their routes \, makes use of the following language: "The general believes he had relieved Harrisburg and Philadelphia, and now desires to look to his own army, and assume position of offensive or defensive, as occasion requires, or rest to the troops."